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IN THE SUPREME COURT
O·F THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.-

Case No.
8346

ERNEST HINES and
JOHNNIE LEACH,
Defendants and Appellants.

Respondent's Brief

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The respondent agrees with the Statement of the
Case set forth in appellants' brief.
STArrEMENT OF FACTS
Except for certain added emphasis on the part of
1
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the appellants, respondent agrees substantially with
their Statement of Facts.

STATENIENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN REFUSING TO
APPOINT A SECOND ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
LEACH AFTER HE HAD ARBITRARILY DISCHARGED
A COMPETENT COURT-APPOINTED ATTORNEY.

POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO
THE JURY, CITED IN POINT II OF APPELLANTS'
BRIEF, AND APPELLANTS FAILED TO MAKE EXCEPTION TO THEM.

POINT III
APPELLANT HINES WAIVED ANY OBJECTION TO
THE READING OF TESTIMONY TO THE JURY AFTER
THE JURY'S RETIREMENT; AND THE COURT DID
NOT ALLOW UNDUE EMPHASIS TO BE PLACED ON
A PORTION OF THE EVIDENCE.

POINT IV
IT WAS DISCRETIONARY WITH THE JUDGE
WHETHER OR NOT TO REQUIRE THE PRESENCE OF
COUNSEL DURING THE READING OF TESTIMONY
TO THE JURY AFTER ITS RETIREMENT; AND IT
WAS NOT ERROR TO ALLOW SUCH READING IN
COUNSEL'S ABSENCE.

POINT V
IT WAS NOT ERROR ON THE PART OF THE COURT
TO ALLOW MISS PARKER, THE COURT STENOG-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

RAPHER, TO TAKE TWO WOMEN JURORS TO THE
LADIES' RESTROOM.

POINT VI
IT IS PRESUMED THAT THE JURY WAS AT ALL
TIMES PROPERLY ADMONISHED; THE APPELLANTS
DID NOT RAISE ANY OBJECTION AT THE TRIAL AND
SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DO SO NOW; AND IF
THE JURY WAS NOT ADMONISHED IMMEDIATELY
PRIOR TO A SHORT INFORMAL RECESS, APPELLANTS WERE NOT PREJUDICED IN THEIR SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS.

POINT VII
IF ERRORS WERE MADE BY THE COURT BELOW,
THEY WERE, IN EVERY CASE, NONPREJUDICIAL
ERRORS WITHOUT NEGATIVE AFFECT UPON THE
SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED APPELLANTS.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN REFUSING TO
APPOINT A SECOND ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
LEACH AFTER HE HAD ARBITRARILY DISCHARGED
A COMPETENT COURT-APPOINTED ATTORNEY.

Respondent agrees that it appears to be a matter
of first impression in the State of Utah whether the
trial court is under a duty to appoint counsel for an
accused in a criminal case where the accused has discharged court-appointed counsel. There is, however,
precedent from other jurisdictions, both federal and
3
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state, that would indicate that the court is not obligated
to appoint further counsel.
It is enough that the court appointed a competent
criminal attorney and it was not necessary that the court
appoint a second attorney after Appellant Leach mformed Mr. Reid, his court-appointed counsel, he no
longer desired to be represented by him.
It is sufficient in such a situation that the courtappointed counsel be a reputable member of the bar.
Beyond that, it is not the prerogative of an indigent
defendant in a criminal case to choose his attorney who
must then lay aside all else and work for him free of
charge.
The defendant cannot have tailor-made counsel and
he cannot run a relay race using a court-appointed attorney for a season, then replacing him with a new fresh
one of his own choosing, but under court appointment.
One good, capable attorney, such as Mr. Reid, was
enough for Mr. Leach.

State v. Griffith, 81 A. 2d 383, held:
''A person accused of crime is only entitled to
counsel to aid him in his defense, not to save him
from his voluntary act."
Leach's foolishness here in discharging reputable
and able counsel was a voluntary act, from the effects of
which it was not necessary that the court attempt to
save him through appointment of a second attorney.

U. 8. v. Gutterman, 147 Fed. 2d 540, states:
''An accused unable to employ an attorney
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must accept such counsel as the court assigns
unless he can find a better reason for asking a
change than the fact that the accused does not
approve of counsel's judgment or unless the
accused chooses to undertake his own defense.''

People v. Adamson, (Calif.), 210 P. 2d 13, in a holding based on comparable, if not precisely similar, facts
stated:
"A defendant's right to counsel did not include the right to postpone trial indefinitely and
reject the services of the public defender while
defendant, at his leisure, attempted to find counsel who would serve without charge and of whom
the defendant and another person approved.''
A Michigan case, People v. Kotak, 11 N. W. 2d 7,
informs us that under a statute providing for the appointment of an attorney for an accused unable to provide his own counsel, the appointment of an attorney
chosen by the accused is not required.

It was held in U.S. ex rel Mitchell v. Thompson, 56
Fed. Supp. 683, that the court's choice of counsel for
defendant should not be subject to impeachment on a
ground of a claimed displeasure with the appointment
or a lack of confidence in the attorney, unless there is
good cause why the appointment should not have been
made; and that the choice of counsel for indigent persons
accused of crime rests with the court and not with the
defendant.
Appellants refer to Ex Parte Masching, 261 P. 2d
251. That case, however, involved a defendant to whom
no counsel had been assigned in the first instance. Here,
5
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Appellant Leach had assigned to him by the court the
excellent services of a widely experienced and capable
attorney.
No denial is attempted that defendant had an inherent constitutional right to counsel. That is rudimentary law. Counsel was, in fact, obtained and proffered him by the court. Appellant Leach does not allege
that counsel assigned was unwilling or unable to go
ahead. Leach summarily dismissed Mr. Reid and thereby, and with adequate chance to repent of his error,
waived his right to court appointment of counsel. (Tr.
15)
In the Masching Case, the defendant was an alleged
traffic violator who claimed to have been bedridden with
illness for three weeks and to have been unable to get
counsel. The court thereupon refused to appoint an
attorney. That case and this one are inimical on their
facts and the holding in the Masching Case should not
concern this Court.
The Robinson Case and the Glasser Case (Appellants' Brief, p. 18) indicate, as appellants stated, that
one attorney cannot be forced on co-defendants. There
was no forcing here at all. In the first place, the codefendants agreeably accepted Mr. Reid as their attorney, and he represented both at the preliminary hearing.
Afterward, Appellant Leach determined to dismiss Mr.
Reid.
The Glasser Case forbids the appointment of one
counsel to represent ''conflicting interests.'' There is
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no showing here of any conflict whatsoever. Counsel
present·s to us three ''points of conflict'' which he claims
to be reason enough to prevent acceptance of dual representation. These reasons were not sufficiently impressive to prevent the acceptance, willingly, by both Hines
and Leach, of Mr. Reid in the first place. If Appellant
Leach wanted to hire representation of his own choosing
at that or any later date, he had every right and enough
opportunity to do it.
POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO
THE JURY, CITED IN POINT II OF APPELLANTS'
BRIEF, AND APPELLANTS FAILED TO MAKE EXCEPTION TO THEM.
As to the quoted instruction of the trial judge, relative to Appellant Leach, that "if he is satisfied with the
evidence which has been given, there is no occasion for
adding thereto," (Appellants' Brief, p. 20) it is impossible for respondent to understand how appellant could
have been damaged thereby.
Counsel go to great lengths to prophesy as to an
assumed reaction in the minds of the jury on hearing
the judge's instruction in that regard. Is it not more
likely that the jury would think instead, "if he is satisfied that there is no need for his own testimony, then
he must have a pretty good case 1"
Clearly, neither appellant nor respondent are in a
position to psychoanalyze the jury on this point. There
i~ no negative inference here that if the defendant is
7
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not satisfied with the evidence, he then should take
the stand. This is indicated by the preceding sentence stating clearly and unequivocally that "no presumption adverse to a defendant is to arise from the
mere fact that he does not place himself on the stand."
That is the law and all there is to it. The point relied
on by appellant is of no consequence since all that is
involved is a simple statement of self-evident law and
fact.
In the prosecution of an accused who offered no
evidence, according to Commonu:ealth v. Pinkenson,
(Pa.), 11 A. 2d 176, a statement in the court's general
charge, that if counsel for the accused felt that the Commonwealth had not proved its case they would naturally
choose to refrain from offering testimony, was not iJ?proper as a reference to the failure of the accused to
testify, in view of the court's fu1·ther statement that no
unfavorable inference could be dra"'n by the failure of
the accused to testify.
The Texas case of Compton v. State, 184 S. W. 2d
630, states that a statute prohibiting the consideration
of defendant's failure to testify as a circumstance
against him does not prohibit the court from alluding
to defendant's failure to testify.
Where an instruction with respect to the nonprejudicial affect of defendant's failure to testify was adequate, refusal to give requested instruction on the same
subject was not error. Wright v. U. 8., 175 Fed. 2d 384.
Respondent does not feel that Appellant Leach was
in any way prejudiced by the instruction Judge Ellett
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gave. If he used the word ''privilege'' where he should
have used ''right,'' he did so innocently and it was a
distinction that escaped the jury's minds.
A deliberate and deep discussion of semantics undoubtedly would bring out a difference between the two
words, it is true; but a lay person sitting on the jury is
not going to be persuaded on a mere hearing that
"privilege" in this connotation means anything more,
less or different than ''right.''
In Brown v. State, (Ark.), 155 S. W. 2d 722, an instruction, that it was defendant's privilege either to testify in his own behalf or to decline to do so and that
failure to testify was neither evidence of guilt nor a
presumption thereof and that defendant's failure to
testify was not to be considered by the jury in determining defendant's guilt, was proper.
Many cases concur with the holding in State v. Paul,
(Iowa), 48 N. W. 2d 309, which is, as quoted from the
syllabus:
''All instructions are to be construed together
in determining the matter of prejudice created
by any part of the instructions.''
See also State v. Spohr, (Kan.), 230 P. 2d 1013; State v.
Livesay, (Idaho), 233 P. 2d 432; People v. Mercer,
(Calif.), 230 P. 2d 4.
Even if the instruction was not proper, reversal
should not be had, according to a Utah case, Cowley v.
State, (Utah), 82 P. 2d 914, which held:
"The court is firmly committed to the rule
9
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that an instruction improper and erroneous will
not be held reversible error where it is manifest
on consideration of all the instructions given, the
testimony in the case, and the verdict of the jury
that such an instruction did not work to the prejudice of the defendant or deprive him of any substantial right."
Instructions in a criminal case, even if erroneous,
are not ground for reversal where they are nonprejudicial. State v. Condit, (Utah), 125 P. 2d 801.
An instruction, upon the trial of an information for
larceny, though confused and misleading, will not afford
ground for reversal if nonprejudicial. State v. Hall,
(Utah), 145 P. 2d 494.
In the instant case both Leach and l\I r. Reid, counsel
for Mr. Hines, stated on page 191 of the transcript that
they had no exceptions to offer to the instructions given
by Judge Ellett. If they invited the error, appellants
cannot now take advantage of it. They knowingly and
openly waived any exceptions they might have had.
Where neither a defendant nor counsel object in the
lower court to instructions to the jury, as in this case,
where, as a matter of fact, both agreed, the appellate
court in State v. Johnson, (N. Mex.), 287 P. 2d 247,
stated:
''Error in the court's instructions to the jury
were waived when the defendant failed to call to
the trial court's attention that it might be committing error, thus offering the court an opportunity to correct its mistake.''
See also U. S.

t'.

Scoblick, 124 Fed. Supp. 881, aud Rucker
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r. U. S., 206 Fed. 2d 464.
Where instructions are palpably erroneous to such
an extent that they would, if allowed by the jury, prevent
a fair and proper determination of the issues, the Supreme Court may notice the error without exception
having been taken; but the mere failure to give an instruction which might have been given but which was
not requested or called to the attention of the court will
not be noticed on appeal in the absence of an exception
taken to the failure to give the instruction. State v.
Peterson, (Utah), 240 P. 2d 504.
POINT III
APPELLANT HINES WAIVED ANY OBJECTION TO
THE READING OF TESTIMONY TO THE JURY AFTER
THE JURY'S RETIREMENT; AND THE COURT DID
NOT ALLOW UNDUE EMPHASIS TO BE PLACED ON
A PORTION OF THE EVIDENCE.

No undue emphasis was placed on testimony read
to the jury, and this is beside the point since Appellant
Hines and his counsel waived any objection. Respondent
relies heavily on Hersey v. Tully, (Colo.), 44 P. 854 and
Jenkins v. Stephens, (Utah), 231 P. 112. In Hersey v.
Tully, supra, certain testimony was read to the jury
after the case had been submitted over the objection of
defend{}IY/,t. In the Jenkins Case, defendant's counsel was
not notified of the reading.
No such objections are heard here. As a matter of
fact and by positive statements, both the appellant and
counsel ( Tr. 196) agreed to a reading of the testimony
11
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to the jury. Appellant waived his rights thereby and
cannot now object to a reading of the testimony.
A case in the Supreme Court of Kansas, State v.
Haines, 278 P. 767, held that it is not error for the court
on the request of the jury, after it has retired to deliberate, to read to the jury an admission made by counsel
for the defendant concerning what the evidence of a
witness for the state would be, but who was not present
when he was called, where the evidence was not objected
to at the time it was admitted but which would have been
inadmissible if proper objection had been made.
Upon receipt of an oral waiver from Hines and Mr.
Reid, the court came on solid ground in ordering the
disputed testimony read. The record says, at page 197,
that the testimony of Mr. Hales and Mr. Crow was read
to the jury. There is no indication that it was read in
anything less, or other, than its full context. There is
nothing to show that a portion only was read. There is
no showing in the record or by the brief of appellants
that it was given undue weight.
There is no indication that the women jurors were
persuaded to hold for conviction because of having heard
this testimony. Their decision and the reasons therefore are not a matter for inquiry, but their decision
could likely have been based on persuasive argument and
conversation on the part of the other jurors.

State v. Peterson, (Utah), 174 P. 2d 843, cited by
appellants, is not in point in any way and has no bearing
on the facts or law of the instant case.
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POINT IV
IT WAS DISCRETIONARY WITH THE JUDGE
WHETHER OR NOT TO REQUIRE THE PRESENCE OF
COUNSEL DURING THE READING OF TESTIMONY
TO THE JURY AFTER ITS RETIREMENT; AND IT
WAS NOT ERROR TO ALLOW SUCH READING IN
COUNSEL'S ABSENCE.

The respondent does not question at all the power
of the court to ?rder defendant's counsel to be present
during the jury's deliberations. The court is not obligated, however, to do so. It is a discretionary matter
with the judge.
Clearly, it is not necessary that counsel be in court
when the defendant's rights are not threatened in any
way and, as here, where telephone contact is maintained
by the client and counsel, and judge and counsel.
Since it is not required that counsel be present in
court, it follows that the reading of testimony in his
physical absence, especially, as here, where objection
was specifically waived by counsel and appellant, is not
error. Therefore, appellants points 4 and 5 are answered
together. In this case the appellants suffered no damage
to their rights whatsoever by counsel's physical absence
from the courtroom. Both Appellant Hines and his
counsel, Mr. Reid, were advised of the desire of the
jurors to have the testimony read to them and both Hines
and :\Ir. Reid waived any objection they might have
raised.
If there is error, it is not prejudicial error, as the
record gives nothing to indicate that Mr. Reid would

13
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have objected even had he been present. :Mr. Reid had
full knowledge that the testimony would be read before
he gave his approval and Appellant Hines did likewise.
All details were available to them; everything was dear.
They had as much opportunity to object as though both,
and not Hines only, had been physically present in court.
The testimony was read simply and clearly, as Mr.
Reid contemplated it would be. Hines had Mr. Reid's
representation at all necessary times. It should be emphasized that Hines contacted and conversed with Mr.
Reid by phone before himself stating that he had no
objection to the reading of the testimony.
Article I, Section 12, of the Constitution of Utah,
relied on by appellants, does not specify that accused's
counsel must attend him at all stages of the trial. He
is guaranteed representation, and, in this case, he received it to the fullest necessary extent. The actual
physical presence of the attorney at every moment,
especially after the case had been tried, was not necessary, nor do either of the statutes set forth by appellants
define the nature of the representation required to be
given or the amount of time the court-appointed counsel
must spend in the physical presence of his defendants.
The Crank Case, cited in appellants' brief (p. 26)
adds nothing to a consideration of this question since it
too fails to set forth just what constitutes representation
as contemplated by the above statutes and constitutional
provision.
Appellants rely on State ~·. Beeny, (Utah), 203 P.
2d 397, for their view that where clarification is requested
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by the jury and counsel has not been waived, the court
should delay proceedings until a diligent effort can be
made to secure counsel's presence.
A careful reading of the Beeny Case indicates the
court held, however, that after the jury came back into
court, instructions could then have been given to the
jury by the court after mere notice to the defendant or
his counsel; but that assuming that the trial court was
of the opinion that despite the statutory provisions (that
notice to appellant was sufficient), the defendants were
entitled under the Constitution to have counsel present
when a jury returned to court and that counsel had not
waived the latter's presence, then, in the premises, the
court should have delayed the proceedings for such
length of time as would have sufficed to render diligent
effort to secure counsel's presence.
In the instant case, the judge did not in his discretion feel, however, that appellants' rights were being
denied by absence of counsel since notice had been given
to counsel; and that being the case, it was not incumbent
upon the judge to rule that diligent effort be made to
secure counsel's presence.
Here, counsel below and Appellant Hines have invited the alleged error by agreeing to the reading of the
evidence to the jury. Appellants cannot now come in
and take advantage of any alleged error which they
themselves brought about. It has frequently been held
not to be error to proceed with the trial in counsel's
absence if the accused is not thereby prejudiced. 23
C. J. S. 80.

15
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The Ohio case of Village of Addyston v. Liddle, 6
N. E. 2d 877, stated:
'' * * * The right of the party accused to the

presence of counsel is in the nature of a personal
privilege and may be waived, and courts need not
compel attendance or enforce vigilance of counsel.
The convenience of counsel cannot be allowed to
obstruct the reasonable dispatch of business."

People v. Holland, (Calif.), 51 P. 2d 881, holds that
where defendant's counsel voluntarily absented himself
from the trial, proceeding with the trial in absence of
such counsel is not error.
Two analogous cases are referred to-Morton v.
State, (Ga.), 10 S. E. 2d 836 and State v. Nichols, (Kan.),
232 P. 1058. The Morton Case stands for the proposition
that where counsel for the accused was absent when the
jury returned and where he did not appear when the
court had directed an officer to endeavor to locate him,
and the court had the accused brought inside the bar
and in regular form polled the jury and then disclosed
and published the verdict, the return of the verdict in
the absence of counsel was not prejudicial error. The
Nichols Case held also that it was not error to receive
the verdict in the absence of defendant's counsel.
22 C. J. S. 484 indicates that many cases hold it to
be discretionary with the court whether or not to continue a case because of the absence of counsel, and it is
not error to proceed.
POINT V
IT WAS NOT ERROR ON THE PART OF THE COURT
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TO ALLOW MISS PARKER, THE COURT STENOGRAPHER, TO TAKE TWO WOMEN JURORS TO THE
LADIES' RESTROOM.

The act of the court reporter, 2\Iiss Parker, in taking
two women jurors to the ladies' restroom, was not prejudicial error. No claim is made that Miss Parker said
anything whatsoever to the jurors about the case, and
appellants specifically state, on page 30 of their brief,
that:
''No accusation of misconduct is levelled at
Miss Parker for escorting these jurors to the
washroom.''

m
~~

]I

The statutes quoted, and several cases, hold that it
is within the discretion of the court whether or not to
let the jury separate during trial. State v. Cano, (Utah),
228 P. 563; State v. Seyboldt, (Utah), 236 P. 225; People
v. Callaghan, (Utah), 6 P. 49. The language of the statute, 77-31-27, Utah Code Annotated 1953, furthermore,
makes it discretionary with the court whether the jurors
are to be accompanied by any officer at all. The language
controlling reads that the jurors may be "permitted to
separate or be kept in the charge of a proper officer."
The Seyboldt Case, above, clearly holds that the
jurors can be allowed to separate on their own and that
whether an officer is to accompany and keep charge
over them is discretionary with the court. The statute
indicates that in the discretion of the court, if "a proper
officer'' is assigned to have charge of the jurors, the
officer must be sworn.
'Vhere the common law prevails rather than a
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specific statute, State v. Lwze, (Wash.), 222 P. 2d 394,
''In a prosecution for rape and burglary, the
fact that bailiff was not sworn to perform the
duties of his office prior to assuming charge of
the jury was not error.''
Appellants object that Miss Parker was, first, not
a proper officer and, second, that she should have been
sworn. (Appellants' Brief, pp. 30 and 31) It is submitted, in light of the statute above, that if Miss Parker
was not a ''proper officer,'' she did not need to be sworn.
Since the jurors could have been separated and could
have gone alone, it follows that Miss Parker could have
acted, as she may have done, as a guide only without
having to assume the character of a ''proper officer'' ;
and if she was not a ''proper officer,'' it was not necessary for her to be sworn. Although it is not set forth
in the record, it can be presumed, according to the
holding Elkins v. State, (Okla.), 233 P. 491, that she was
sworn.
Appellants supply, on page 31 of their brief, some
possibilities that :Miss Parker might have pursued on
the brief trip to the restroom (an excursion, of course,
that did not lend itself to any serious discussion of a
criminal case). They do not, however, as pointed out
above, allege any misconduct whatsoever on the part of
Miss Parker in any way.
Of all the available personnel who might have
escorted the women jurors to the restroom, Miss Parker
perhaps was best qualified. She had heard judges, perhaps hundreds of times, tell jurors not to converse with
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the one in charge of them during adjournments. As a
sworn court reporter, she was aware of her serious
duties as an officer of the court. She was accustomed
to the procedure and protocol entertained by courts of
this state. She was aware of penalties for intimidating
juries. No better choice could be had.

i1!

IIi

In light of the fact that no misconduct IS laid by
appellants to Miss Parker, it should be further pointed
out that it is presumed that a jury will act in a proper
and orderly fashion with careful effort to preserve the
rights of the defendant. This is the holding in Steadman v. State, (Tenn.), 282 S. W. 2d 777, wherein it is
stated:
''There is a presumption of right acting
attending a jury so long as it is not guilty of misconduct.''

ffii

No improper relationship is alleged, except by innuendo, hetwee11 ::..Iiss Parker and the two women jurors.
N" evertheless, it is interesting to note the holding in
Parker v. State, (Okla.), 193 P. 2d 607, which indicates
that a verdict will not be set aside because of improper
comments between jurors and officers, which comments
are not of a character calculated to prejudice accused
or to influence the verdict.
No objection was shown in the record to the jurors
going with Miss Parker and counsel was present
when the court so ordered and counsel said nothing to
the contrary.
rrhe Supreme Court of Arkansas has said on thi8
point in Atterbury v. State, 20 S. W. 411:
19
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"We hold that it is too late after verdict to
object for the first time that a jury retired from
court in charge of an officer to whom the oath
had not been administered where it appeared that
the defendant was present when it retired and
neither asked that the special oath be administered to him nor objected to his taking charge
of the jury and it does not appear that either
the officer or the jury was guilty of any misconduct.''
The Court should also consider Odell v. Hudspeth,
( Kan.), 189 Fed. 2d 300, which held :
"The fact that a sheriff in a murder prosecution acted as bailiff and custodian of the jury
during the trial would not void the judgment
even though the sheriff also was a witness for
the prosecution.''

POINT VI
IT IS PRESUMED THAT THE JURY WAS AT ALL
TIMES PROPERLY ADMONISHED; THE APPELLANTS
DID NOT RAISE ANY OBJECTION AT THE TRIAL AND
SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DO SO NOW; AND IF
THE JURY WAS NOT ADMONISHED IMMEDIATELY
PRIOR TO A SHORT INFORMAL RECESS, APPELLANTS WERE NOT PREJUDICED IN THEIR SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS.

Where there is nothing in the record to show that
the jury was properly admonished, it will be presumed
that the court performed its duty in that regard. Elkins
r. State, supra., Redman v. Territory, (Okla.), 37 P. 826,
holds that in the absence of direct proof to the contrary,
we must presume that the court below admonished the
jury, as provided by law, and did all that was necessary
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to be done. The presumption is that the court duly
admonished the jury as to their duty. The rule that all
reasonable presumptions and intendments will be made
in favor of the ruling of the trial court is one of the best
settled and most recently applied rules in appellate procedure. See also Donahue v. State, (Tex.), 236 S. W. 86
and Caw v. People, 3 Neb. 357.
ltl!,

001·
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In Quayle v. State, (Ariz.), 165 P. 331, the court
said:
''The court must presume, the record being
silent, that the trial court performed its duty,
and will not inquire for the first time on appeal
whether that duty has been violated.''

People v. Berger, 275 P. 2d 799, reaffirms definite
law that an appellate court will not indulge in presumptions to defeat a judgment.
"The appellants were present at the trial and
might have objected, and should have objected,
to any failure of the trial court to follow the
prescribed procedure. We presume, if appellants
deemed their rights jeopardized by the alleged
omission, that they would, therefore, have objected; and if they saw and did not object, or
failed to see any irregularity in the matter, they
waived it and cannot be heard to complain for
the first time on appeal.''

Yarborough v. State, (Okla.), 162 P. 2d 678 and State
v. 111orris, (Ore.), 114 P. 476, both hold that where the
defendant does not object to the failure of the court to
give the proper admonition, it would be presumed on
appeal that the error did not work any substantial
prejudice to his rights.
21
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POINT VII
IF ERRORS WERE MADE BY THE COURT BELOW,
THEY WERE, IN EVERY CASE, NONPREJUDICIAL
ERRORS WITHOUT NEGATIVE AFFECT UPON THE
SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED APPELLANTS.

The recent Utah case, State v. Neal, 262 P. 2d 756,
approves and sustains this line of reasoning in stating
that the court will not reverse criminal causes for mere
error or irregularity. It is only where there has been
error which' is both substantial and prejudicial to the
rights of the accused that a reversal is warranted. Other
Utah cases holding with, and precedent for, the Neal
Case are State v. Romeo, 128 P. 530; State v. Estes, 176
P. 271; and State v. Woods, 220 P. 215.
Here, the judge and the jury were very careful to
preserve the rights of defendants, Leach and Hines, to
the best of their ability. This is especially manifest by
the great effort the judge went to in affording ~1r. Leach
a reputable attorney and allowing him, on rejection of
~fr. Reid, to obtain one of his own.
A conviction will not be set aside for mere technical
errors of the accused. State v. Thompson, (Ariz.), 206
P. 2d 1037.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, proceedings
of a court properly exercising criminal jurisdiction are
presumed to be regular, and mere failure of the records
to show it does not overcome this presumption; and after
a verdict, all permissible inferences must be made in
the fayor of the prosecution. This is made clear by
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77-42-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, which states.
''After hearing an appeal the court must give
judgment without regard to errors or defects
which do not affect the substantial rights of the
parties. If error has been committed, it shall not
be presumed to have resulted in prejudice. The
court must be satisfied that it has that effect
before it is warranted in reversing the judgment.''
Ordinarily the Supreme Court refuses to review
matters not excepted to in the trial court. Since being
a court of review, it should first allow the trial court the
opportunity to rule on matters brought before it for
consideration. State v. Peterson., (Utah), supra.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the lo\ve,r court should be affirmed.
]:,

Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER
Attorney General
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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